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I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Most cities are structured through one of two different forms of government: “councilmanager” and “strong-mayor.” 1 In council-manager cities, the mayor and each council member
has equal strength in developing policy. 2 The city manager handles the day-to-day community
operations, including making all personnel decisions. 3 The strong-mayor system is modeled after
state and federal governments, so the mayor leads as a governor or the president would, and the
city council acts as the legislature. 4 As a result, the mayor does not have a vote, but does have
veto power. 5 Most large city governments, including New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and
San Francisco, have a strong-mayor form of government. 6
Measure L, which is on the ballot in the city of Sacramento, aims to change the
government structure from council-manager to strong-mayor. 7 Revisions under Measure L
would include removing the mayor’s vote on the city council, but giving the mayor veto power
over ordinances and the city budget; vesting power akin to that of a chief executive officer in the
mayor, rather than the city manager; conferring the power to make personnel decisions,
including appointing and removing the city manager, to the mayor; and imposing term limits on
the mayor and council members. 8
Proponents state a strong-mayor government would create more accountability, place
checks and balances on the government, and help modernize Sacramento. 9 Opponents, however,
insist putting the ultimate power over city government into the hands of one elected official will
make it easier for special interests to influence decision making. 10 In addition, they feel the
“system is working well…if it’s not broken, don’t break it.” 11 This article will discuss
1

STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, STRUCTURES, http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structures.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014).
2
Cal. City Mgmt. Foundation and Int’l City/County Mgmt. Ass’n, Council-Manager or “Strong Mayor”:
The Choice is Clear (2001), https://icma.org/Documents/Document/Document/302618.
3
Id.
4
Structures, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structures.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014).
5
Id.
6
STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, TOP 25 CITIES (2012) available at
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/images/City_List_Top_25_2011_Publication.pdf.
7
SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A (2013), available at
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/CityClerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf.
8
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS OF MEASURE L PREPARED BY SACRAMENTO CITY
ATTORNEY 1–2 (2014), available at http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/CityClerk/Elections/MeasureL_ImpartialAnalysis.pdf [“IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS”].
9
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE L, available at
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_For.pdf [“IN FAVOR”].
10
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE L, available at
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_RebuttalAGAINST.pdf
[“REBUTTAL TO FAVOR”].
11
“Strong Mayor” Forum, Sierra Curtis Neighborhood Ass’n (Sept. 22, 2014) [“Forum”] (statement of
council member Steve Hansen) (notes on file with the California Initiative Review).
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Sacramento’s current government, the history of strong-mayor in Sacramento, how Measure L
would change the law, constitutional and charter implications of the initiative, and public policy
considerations. 12
II.

CURRENT LAW

In California, all incorporated cities are what are known as “general law” cities, unless
the electorate of a city opts to be what is called a “charter city.” 13 Sacramento is a charter city. 14
A. Charter Cities
In operation, a city’s charter is analogous to a state’s or country’s constitution. 15 A city
charter provides both broad authority and vestment of powers in a governing body, as well as
acts as “an instrument of limitation on the broad power of charter cities over municipal affairs.” 16
The city’s electorate must approve the charter and any revisions. 17 Only conflicting provisions in
the state or federal constitutions, or any state statute on a matter of statewide concern can
preempt the laws contained in a city’s charter. 18
The California Constitution grants cities the authority to adopt a charter. 19 Once a charter
is adopted, a charter city has the power to create and regulate a police force and conduct
municipal elections, and broad authority over its governmental structure, including all aspects of
employment. 20
The 482 incorporated cities in California have either one of two forms of municipal
governmental structure: the “council-manager” structure or the “strong-mayor” structure. 21
General law cities must operate under the council-manager structure. 22 While charter cities have
the option of adopting either structural format, of California’s 120 charter-cities, “only five use
the true strong-mayor form.” 23
//
//
//
12

Infra Sections II–VI.
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
14
See EILEEN TEICHERT AND MATTHEW RUYAK, PROPOSED 2012 CHARTER REVISION ANALYSIS 6
(2012), available at http://www.cityofsacramento.org/cityattorney/documents/StaffReport1_17_12.pdf
[“2012 ANALYSIS”] (stating the charter “operates as a ‘Constitution’”).
15
See id. at 7 (stating the charter “operates as a ‘Constitution’”).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
20
2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 7.
21
Id.
22
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34409 (West 2014).
23
2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 7.
13
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B. Current Sacramento Charter Law
Like all city charters, Sacramento’s presiding document identifies a governing body, and
vests widespread powers in it. 24
1. The City Council: Article III
In its most-current version, Sacramento’s charter vests authority in the nine-member city
council to act as the governing body of the city. 25 The council comprises eight members, each
elected from one of eight districts within the city limits.26 The ninth member of the council is the
mayor. 27 The city council is the legislative body within municipal government, and is vested
with various powers including the power to propose and adopt city ordinances to be contained
within the municipal code, reapportion and redistrict council-seat districts, conduct investigations
into the affairs of city government, and conduct legislative business at public meetings. 28
Currently, council members are not subject to any term limits.29
2. The Mayor: Article IV
The mayor is the “presiding officer of the city.” 30 While he or she is a voting member of
the council, the mayor also assumes the leadership role in relations between city government and
the citizens of Sacramento. 31 In effect, the mayor of Sacramento is seemingly intended as a
position that will guide the council in the administration of its legislative duties, ensuring the
priorities of the city’s citizens are furthered, all while maintaining a position of equal-footing
with other members of the council. 32 The charter also grants specific powers and duties to the
mayor, including that he or she may propose ordinances and resolutions for the council to
consider and shall appoint and may remove members of boards, commissions, and advisory
agencies. 33 The mayor is elected to a term of four years. 34 Currently, there are no term limits for
this office. 35
3. The City Manager: Article V
Under the charter, the city manager is vested with the role and responsibility of being the
city’s chief executive officer, overseeing the numerous departments that make up Sacramento’s
municipal government. 36 In essence, the city manager is responsible for the city’s day-to-day
24

SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. II §§ 10, § 20–21.
Id., art. III, § 20–21.
26
Id., art. III, § 21.
27
Id.
28
Id., art. III, §§ 24–25, 31–32, 34.
29
Id., art. III, §26.
30
Id., art. IV, § 40.
31
Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(2).
32
Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(2)–(5).
33
Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(6)–(7).
34
Id., art. IV, § 42–43.
35
Id., art. IV, § 43.
36
Id., art. V, § 61(b).
25
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administration. 37 In addition, the charter vests in the city manager various powers and duties,
including the responsibility to ensure that all laws and ordinances are enforced; to act as an
advisor to the city council; to oversee and manage contracts, leases, and permits that the city
council enters into for goods and services; and to propose the annual city budget. 38
Sacramento’s charter anticipates the need for separation of powers because it expressly
prohibits the council from circumventing the city manager to work with any part of city
government under the manager’s direction and supervision, including any attempts to appoint or
hire any city officer or employee. 39 Similarly, the charter provides for checks on the authority of
the city manager through its grant of investigatory power to the city council. 40 In order to remove
the city manager from office, at least six city council members must approve his or her
termination. 41
4. The Annual Budget: Article IX
Under the existing charter, the city manager develops and proposes the city’s budget for
presentation to the city council not less than 60 days prior to start of each fiscal year. 42 The city
council then considers the budget recommendations during public hearings, and ultimately votes
by resolution to adopt a budget for the upcoming fiscal year. 43
III.

HISTORY OF STRONG-MAYOR
A. Strong-Mayor Government in Other Cities

Many city government structures were originally based on the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government, but moved toward council-manager governance in the wake
of a number of mayoral corruption scandals in the early 1900s. 44
Since the early 1990s, cities with more than 100,000 residents have steadily adopted
strong-mayor systems. 45 One reason is that growing cities have growing numbers of interest
groups, and it is easier to have one person as a point-of-contact for those groups. 46

37

2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 17.
SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 61(a), (c), (g), (i).
39
Id., art. V, § 62.
40
Id., art. V, § 62(a).
41
Id., art. V, § 63.
42
Id., art. IX, § 111(a).
43
Id.
44
J.T. Long, A Short History of the Strong Mayor in California, PUBLIC CEO (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://www.publicceo.com/2009/09/a-short-history-of-the-strong-mayor-in-california/.
45
Structural Trends, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE,
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structuraltrends.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
46
Lisa Nisenson, Romper Room: The Strong Mayor Versus Strong City Manager Debate, THIS WEEK IN
SARASOTA (July 27, 2012), http://www.thisweekinsarasota.com/2012/07/romper-room-the-strong-mayorversus-strong-city-manager-debate/.
38
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Not all cities have embraced the trend. 47 Columbia, South Carolina voters defeated a
strong-mayor initiative last year despite support from the governor, Chamber of Commerce, and
other mayors across the state. 48 Large cities like Baltimore, Dallas, Indianapolis, Phoenix, and
San Antonio maintain their council-manager systems. 49 El Paso, Texas abandoned its strongmayor system in 2004, while Topeka, Kansas and Cedar Rapids, Iowa chose to adopt councilmanager governance when replacing their commission governments. 50 Portland retains a
council-manager form of government because voters there think “shared leadership is better than
centralized power.” 51
In California, five cities have adopted a strong-mayor system: Fresno, Los Angeles,
Oakland, San Diego, and San Francisco. 52 Their structures vary; for example, Fresno and
Oakland still have a city manager, while the other cities place all management decisions in the
mayor’s hands. 53
There is mixed feedback regarding California’s strong-mayor systems. 54 Critics of
Oakland’s system assert the charter is vague and creates uncertainty regarding which public
official has responsibility over certain departments. 55 Former Fresno mayor Karen Humphrey
regrets her role in that city’s adoption of a strong-mayor system. 56 On the other hand, San
Diego’s strong-mayor governance successfully made it through a five-year trial period. 57 Voters
permanently adopted the structure in 2010, but made some changes, including adding a ninth
council seat to prevent tie votes. 58 There have, however, been abuses of power in San Diego
since that permanent adoption. 59

47

Pat Lynch, Strong Mayor, EAST SACRAMENTO PRESERVATION (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://eastsacpreservation.org/strong-mayor/.
48
Id.
49
STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, TOP 25 CITIES (2012) available at
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/images/City_List_Top_25_2011_Publication.pdf.
50
Structural Trends, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE,
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structuraltrends.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
51
Lynch, supra note 47.
52
J.T. Long, A Short History of the Strong Mayor in California, PUBLIC CEO (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://www.publicceo.com/2009/09/a-short-history-of-the-strong-mayor-in-california/.
53
Id.
54
See, e.g., J. Douglas Allen-Taylor, Undercurrents: Oakland’s ‘Strong-Mayor’ Charter Ambiguous as to
Mayor’s Duties, BERKELEY DAILY PLANET (Feb. 11, 2010, 9:46 AM),
http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2010-02-11/article/34636?headline=Undercurrents-Oakland-sStrong-Mayor-Charter-Ambiguous-As-to-Mayor-s-Duties--By-J.-Douglas-Allen-Taylor- (voicing
concerns that the mayor’s power is unclear).
55
Id.
56
Forum, supra note 11 (statement of council member Steve Hansen).
57
A History of San Diego Government, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, http://www.sandiego.gov/cityclerk/aboutus/history.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
58
Id.
59
Monica Garske, R. Stickney, and Gene Cubbison, Former San Diego Mayor Bob Filner Sentenced,
NBC SAN DIEGO (Dec. 9, 2013, 8:17 PM), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Former-Mayor-BobFilner-to-Be-Sentenced-Monday-234905381.html.
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Despite the opinions on each side regarding the effectiveness of a strong-mayor structure
in other California cities, research has shown the system to be equally as effective as councilmanager governance. 60 Both forms of government generally champion citizens’ needs in equal
ways. 61 No form of government is perfect, but both can be successful as long as those elected put
the needs of the people first. 62
B. Sacramento’s Prior Strong-Mayor Governments
In 1849, the electorate of the soon-to-be formed City of Sacramento voted to adopt the
Sacramento City Charter, thereby establishing Sacramento as a municipality. 63 The charter
reflected voters’ desires to move away from the alcalde court system, which the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo established, and to implement a form of governance more reflective of the
democratic process in the local governments of the eastern states from which they had
emigrated. 64 The form of government created was analogous to today’s strong-mayor form of
government. 65 Borrowing from the Spanish tradition, the 1849 charter created a “councilalcalde” system. 66 An “alcalde” is a traditional municipal magistrate who had both judicial and
administrative functions. 67 In the modern Spanish language, alcalde is the equivalent of the
English word mayor. 68
The council-alcalde form of government in Sacramento was brief; the Legislature passed
a law in 1858 that consolidated city and county governments into one municipal system. 69 In

60

Sam Sturgis, Strong Mayor, Weak Mayor, No Mayor—In Terms of Policy, It May Not Matter Much,
CITY LAB (July 31, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/07/strong-mayor-weak-mayor-nomayorin-terms-of-policy-it-may-not-matter-much/375347/.
61
Id.
62
Lisa Nisenson, Romper Room: The Strong Mayor versus Strong City Manager Debate, THIS WEEK IN
SARASOTA (July 27, 2012), http://www.thisweekinsarasota.com/2012/07/romper-room-the-strong-mayorversus-strong-city-manager-debate/.
63
Kathryn Gaeddert, Introduction, For the Record: Catalog of the Public Records, City of Sacramento
1849–1982, Sacramento County, 1848–1982, CENTER FOR SACRAMENTO HISTORY, at 3 (Mar. 1, 1982),
available at http://pdf.oac.cdlib.org/pdf/samcc/forrecor.pdf.
64
Id.
65
Interview with Phil Isenberg, former mayor, City of Sacramento, in Sacramento, Cal. (Oct. 2, 2014)
[“Isenberg interview”] (notes on file with the California Initiative Review); Your City in Action! The City
of Sacramento Charter Revision, LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-the-city-of-sacramento-charterrevision/.
66
Isenberg interview, supra note 65; Your City in Action! The City of Sacramento Charter Revision,
LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009), http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-thecity-of-sacramento-charter-revision/.
67
Alcalde, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/13206/alcalde (last
visited Oct. 5, 2014).
68
Id.
69
Isenberg interview, supra note 65; NELLIE MAY HENDERSON COLE, CONSOLIDATION OF SACRAMENTO
CITY AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT, 1858–1863 (1958).
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1863, that radical change was overturned, and Sacramento returned to a mayor-council form of
governance, which lasted until 1911. 70
Although the city governance change several times throughout the century, it took until
1989 for a citizen commission to recommend a strong-mayor system in Sacramento, along with a
return to a consolidated city and county government. 71 Thus, the “new” concept of a strongmayor system in Sacramento is actually not new at all, but rather reflects the ebb and flow of
ideas regarding forms of governance. 72
C. Recent Sacramento Strong-Mayor Proposals
Prior to Measure L, there were three strong-mayor proposals, beginning with a version
Sacramento Mayor Kevin Johnson advocated for shortly after taking office in 2008. 73
1. 2009 Citizen Initiative
In 2009, the city council voted to support a citizen-proposed strong-mayor initiative if
enough citizen support was gathered through petition circulation to place it on the June 2010
ballot. 74 The measure would have given the mayor power akin to that of a chief executive
officer. The mayor would have taken on the duties of the city manager, including preparing
budgets and appointing and removing the city manager, clerk, treasurer, and attorney, as well as
most other city employees. 75 The mayor no longer would have been a member of the city
council, but would have been able to veto council decisions. 76 To ensure that there would not be
a tie vote in city council decisions, a ninth district would have been added. 77
At the same time that the council voiced its support for the initiative, the council
recognized that the measure, as drafted, could have been unconstitutional. 78 The initiative would
have altered nine articles of the Sacramento City Charter. 79 The breadth of these changes would

70

Isenberg interview, supra note 65; Your City in Action! The City of Sacramento Charter Revision,
LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009), http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-thecity-of-sacramento-charter-revision/.
71
Ed Salzman, Mayors Move to Power in California City Halls, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 1989),
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-07-23/opinion/op-115_1_city-council-member.
72
Isenberg interview, supra note 65.
73
Craig Powell, Welcome Back, Strong Mayor, INSIDE PUBLICATIONS (Nov. 30, 2013),
http://www.insidepublications.org/index.php/inside-city-hall/522-welcome-back-strong-mayor [“Powell”]
Mayor Kevin Johnson, CITY OF SACRAMENTO, http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/MayorCouncil/Districts/Mayor (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
74
EILEEN TEICHERT, STRONG MAYOR INITIATIVE LEGAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3 (2009), available at
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2085&meta_id=184461
[“TEICHERT”].
75
Id. at 3–4.
76
Id. at 4.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 3.
79
Id. at 7.
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have amounted to a city charter revision, rather than an amendment. 80 Since the California
Constitution does not allow a city to revise its charter through the initiative process unless its city
council places the measure on the ballot, the proposed initiative could have been found
unconstitutional. 81 Despite a warning from the city attorney regarding the possible
unconstitutionality of the measure, it was placed on the ballot. 82
As a result, Bill Camp of the Sacramento Central Labor Council filed suit for a
preliminary injunction to prevent a vote on the initiative before its constitutionality was
adjudicated. 83 The parties ultimately agreed that the initiative the electorate proposed was
beyond voters’ power, so city officials removed it from the ballot, but the council did create a
charter review committee to make recommendations for future charter revisions. 84
2. 2010 Council Proposal
When the citizen-driven initiative was enjoined, the city council did consider placing a
new charter revision on the June 2010 ballot. 85 That version would not have given the mayor
power to appoint the city attorney and other employees. 86 However, it would still have limited
the number of terms to which the mayor and council members could be elected and given the
mayor appointment power for the city manager position. 87 The revisions would have had a
“sunset,” or expiration date, without voter re-approval. 88 The city council did not vote to place
the measure on the ballot, much to Mayor Johnson’s disappointment, because members said the
mayor had not presented any evidence that the existing council-manager system was not
working. 89

80

Id. at 5, 7–10.
Id. at 5, 10.
82
Camp v. Sacramento, No. 34-2009-00065404, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento Jan. 21, 2010) (order
granting preliminary injunction).
83
Id.
84
Camp v. Sacramento, No. 34-2009-00065404 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento filed Dec. 15, 2010)
(stipulated judgment); WILLIAM EDGAR ET AL., SACRAMENTO CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL
REPORT 24 (2009), http://www.cityofsacramento.org/charter/documents/CRC_Final_Report.pdf
[“EDGAR”].
85
KUNAL MERCHANT, REPORT BACK: CHARTER REFORM PACKAGE 2 (2010), available at
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2205&meta_id=191740.
86
Kathleen Haley, Johnson Aims to Put Strong Mayor Plan on November Ballot, SACRAMENTO PRESS
(Feb. 16, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://sacramentopress.com/2010/02/16/johnson-aims-to-put-strong-mayorplan-on-november-ballot/.
87
Id.
88
KUNAL MERCHANT, REPORT BACK: CHARTER REFORM PACKAGE 1 (2010), available at
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2205&meta_id=191740.
89
Nick Miller, Sacramento City Council Approves Strong Mayor Vote for 2014 at Drama-Free Meeting
(Boring! So Let’s Watch an Old Video of K.J. Chewing out his Colleagues), SACRAMENTO NEWS &
REVIEW (Nov. 6, 2013, 2:34 PM),
http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/pageburner/blogs/post?oid=11973042; Sacramento Council
Votes Against Strong-Mayor Plan, RECORDNET.COM (June 23, 2010, 8:42 AM),
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100623/A_NEWS/100629945.
81
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3. 2012 Expanded Council Proposal
After the initial attempts to place a measure on the 2010 ballot did not move forward,
Mayor Johnson introduced a different proposal in 2012, which similarly did not make it to the
ballot. 90 The new mayoral powers that would have been granted were largely the same, but the
plan would have added a ninth council district and council seat, as well as created an “at-large”
council member position, bringing the total number of council seats to ten. 91 The at-large
member would have been elected city-wide, just like the mayor, and would have cast votes on
behalf of the entire city since the mayor would no longer be able to vote. 92 Because there would
have been an even number of council members, however, the mayor would have been able to
cast tie-breaker votes. 93
4. 2014 Measure L
For the latest iteration, Sacramento Tomorrow took over the movement to promote a
strong-mayor government in the city. 94 The group and its 28 advisory committee members
worked to create a new proposal, and planned to reach out to the community for feedback. 95
Very little feedback was sought, however, and voters did not have a chance to review the group’s
recommendations. 96
In November 2013, the Sacramento City Council approved a resolution to place a
revision to the city charter on the November 2014 ballot. 97 That resolution ultimately became
Measure L. 98 The resolution is very similar to Mayor Johnson’s last proposal, but with slight
changes, including a limit of three terms for the mayor, rather than two. 99 Four council
members—Angelique Ashby, Steve Cohn, Jay Schenirer, and Allen Warren—and Mayor
Johnson voted in support, while council members Darrell Fong, Steve Hansen, Kevin McCarty,
and Bonnie Pannell opposed the resolution. 100 Council member Hansen is now leading the
charge against Measure L with support from former Sacramento mayors Anne Rudin and
Heather Fargo, the League of Women Voters, and the Democratic Party of Sacramento County,
90

See Powell, supra note 73 (stating that the court stopped the first proposal in 2009 and the city council
did not support proposals in 2010 and 2012).
91
Antonio Harvey, City Council Votes Against Strong Mayor, For Charter Commission, SACRAMENTO
OBSERVER (Feb. 8, 2012), http://sacobserver.com/2012/02/city-council-votes-against-strong-mayor-forcharter-commission/.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Powell, supra note 73.
95
Id.
96
Id.; Interview with Matthew Ruyak, Assistant City Attorney, City of Sacramento, in Sacramento, Cal.
(Sept. 3, 2014) (notes on file with the California Initiative Review).
97
SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013–0362, at 3 (2013).
98
Ryan Lillis, Sacramento Councilman Steve Hansen to Lead Opposition to Strong-Mayor Plan,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:00 a.m.),
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/19/6637677/sacramento-councilman-steve-hansen.html [“LillisHansen”].
99
Powell, supra note 73.
100
SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013–0362, at 3 (2013).
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while Mayor Johnson has found allies in state Senator Darrell Steinberg, former Sacramento
mayor Phil Isenberg, former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and several unions. 101
IV.

PROPOSED LAW

Measure L seeks to enact significant changes to the roles of the city council, mayor, and
city manager, as well as how the budget is proposed and approved. 102
A. The City Council: Article III
Measure L would reduce the size of the city council from nine to eight council members,
removing the mayor as a member. 103 As such, this new composition of council members has the
potential to lead to ties on ordinances and other measures that come before the body for a vote. 104
Measure L does not provide a provision to remedy tie votes that result from a council of eight
members. 105
The council would also be required to elect a president and vice president from amongst
its members. 106 In the mayor’s absence from the city, the president and vice president would
serve as mayor in their respective order, and would assume all the vested rights and powers of
the mayor with the significant exceptions of “the power of any veto or any other discretionary
privilege that is enjoyed” by the mayor. 107
The enactment of Measure L would impose term limits on council members. 108
Specifically, each city council member would only be permitted to serve three, four-year
terms. 109 This change would not apply retroactively to terms already served by existing council
members. 110

101

Lillis-Hansen, supra note 98; CITY OF SACRAMENTO, ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE L, available at
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_Against.pdf
[“AGAINST”]; CITY OF SACRAMENTO, REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE L, available at
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_Against.pdf
[“REBUTTAL TO AGAINST”].
102
SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A (2013), available at
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/CityClerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf.
103
Id. § 21 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 21 and adding SACRAMENTO, CAL.
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In addition, Measure L seeks to add two requirements relating to community interaction
and involvement. 111 First, Measure L would require that the city council hold at least two of its
city council meetings per year outside of its chambers. 112 The purpose of this requirement is to
“improve citizen involvement and accessibility to [council] meetings.” 113 The revision would
also require voter approval for increases in council member compensation that exceed five
percent. 114 Second, Measure L would require the city council to establish by ordinance a
“Neighborhood Advisory Committee,” with the intended purpose of “considering the interests of
the city’s neighborhoods.” 115 The text of Measure L does not elaborate on the intended duties or
responsibilities of this committee, and thus it is not clear what the scope of this newlyestablished body would be. 116
B. The Mayor: Article IV
Under Measure L, the position of mayor would be transformed from being a largely
symbolic “presiding officer,” to the role of the city’s chief executive officer. 117 In addition, the
basic description of the mayor’s role would be expanded to provide that he or she “shall have the
executive and administrative authorities, powers, and responsibilities of the city as provided
herein, including but not limited to the power and duty to execute and enforce all laws,
ordinances, and polices of the city.” 118 Measure L would make specific changes to the mayor’s
“authorities, powers, and responsibilities,” as they relate to the city’s annual budget, the mayor’s
place and role within the governance structure, the mayor’s administrative powers, and the
mayor’s interaction and community involvement. 119 A mayor would be limited to three, fouryear terms. 120 This limit, however, would not apply retroactively to the current mayor’s
previously-served terms. 121
1. The Mayor’s Interaction with the City Council
As discussed above, 122 Measure L would remove the mayor as a voting member of the
city council, thereby reducing the number of council members from nine to eight. 123 In the
mayor’s new role, he or she would retain the right, but would not be obligated, to “attend and be
111
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heard” at city council meetings. 124 The mayor would not have a right to vote on matters before
the council. 125 Because the mayor is no longer a member of the council, the newly composed
council of eight members presents the opportunity for tie votes on ordinances and other measures
that come before the body. 126 Measure L, however, does not provide a remedy for how tie votes
will be broken. 127
2. The Annual Budget
Measure L would transfer the responsibility and power to propose the city’s annual
budget from the city manager to the mayor. 128 The mayor would be required to propose an
annual budget to the city council no later than 90 days before the start of each fiscal year. 129
Following the city council’s review, alteration of, and passage of a budget, under Measure L, the
mayor would possess line-item veto power, which means that he or she would have the power to
unilaterally strike specific portions of the council’s approved budget in part or in entirety. 130
3. New Executive Powers – The Mayoral Veto Power
In addition to the mayor’s existing authority to propose ordinances and resolutions for the
city council to consider, Measure L would give the mayor veto power over any ordinances the
council passed. 131 This mayoral veto power is akin to the veto power of other executive heads,
such as the president and the governor. 132
Measure L would limit the mayor’s veto power. 133 Specifically, the mayor would not
have veto power over “urgency” ordinances—those that would either take effect immediately
upon adoption or less than 30 days after adoption—relating to an election, an emergency, or an
ordinance adopted pursuant to a state law. 134 In addition, the mayor would lack veto power over
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ordinances adopting the recommendations of the Independent Citizens’ Redistricting
Commission, which Measure L’s revisions would create. 135
The mayor would be required to review all adopted ordinances and resolutions and
approve or veto them within ten days of the city council’s adoption. 136 If the mayor were to take
no action on a measure, it would be deemed approved. 137 If the mayor were to exercise the veto
power, however, he or she must include an explanation of the basis for that decision. 138 The
council would have 30 days to reconsider a vetoed matter, but could only override the mayor’s
veto if the reconsidered ordinance or resolution receives at least six council votes in favor of its
adoption. 139
4. City Manager Appointment
A significant new authority under Measure L would be the mayor’s right to appoint the
city manager, a power currently vested in the city council. 140 While the city council’s right to
confirm the appointee would restrict this power, the mayor’s ability to remove the city manager
would not be subject to any outside approval and would not require good cause. 141 Furthermore,
Measure L would require the mayor to hold an open meeting at which citizens may ask questions
regarding the qualifications of the candidates for city manager before making an appointment. 142
5. Community Interaction
If enacted, Measure L would require that the mayor address the citizens of Sacramento on
an annual basis through a “State of the City” address. 143 Similar to the executive addresses of the
president and governors, the mayor’s State of the City statement would not just address the
135
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general status of city government, but would also include the mayor’s policy recommendations
for the coming year. 144 Measure L would also require the mayor to host and participate in at least
two “town hall” meetings each year as a means of receiving public input. 145 Measure L does not
indicate how the mayor should utilize such public input in formulating ordinances or policy. 146
C. The City Manager: Article V
Measure L seeks to significantly alter the role and authorities prescribed to the city
manager. 147 No longer appointed by the city council, the city manager would be appointed by the
mayor, with confirmation by the council. 148 Specifically, the city council would have ten
business days to either confirm or reject a mayoral city manager appointee. 149 Failure to confirm
or reject would constitute approval. 150
Measure L most dramatically seeks to alter the process by which the city manager may be
removed from office. 151 If approved by the voters, under Measure L the city manager would be
subject to dismissal per the mayor, without council notification or approval. 152 This proposed
change is in stark contrast to the charter’s current procedure for removal of the city manager,
which prohibits such action unless at least six members of the city council vote in favor of such
removal. 153 The current charter specifies that no city manager may be removed within the first
twelve months of his or her term of office, except for cause. 154 This provision would no longer
exist if Measure L is enacted. 155
Functionally, the overall role of the city manager in citywide government would be
dramatically altered from the position’s current status. 156 No longer would the city manager be
the city’s chief executive officer, but would become the city’s chief administrative officer. 157
Similarly, the charter’s overall description of the position’s purpose would be amended to read
that the city manager is “acting on the mayor’s behalf and in furtherance of the mayor’s powers”
when he or she carries out the position’s duties. 158
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D. The Annual Budget: Article IX
In addition to transferring the power to propose the budget from the city manager to the
mayor, Measure L would establish the Office of the Independent Budget Analyst. 159 The city
council would be responsible for appointing the head of that office, whose duties would be “to
assist and advise the city council in conducting budgetary inquiries and in making budgetary
decisions.” 160 The independent budget analyst would be subject to removal by the council, at any
time with or without cause. 161
The city council would be required to hold a minimum of two public hearings on the
proposed budget within a specified timeframe. 162 Upon the city council’s request, the
independent budget analyst would provide an unbiased analysis of the mayor’s proposed
budget. 163 Once these procedures are complete, the city council would be required to adopt a
budget no less than 30 days before the start of each fiscal year. 164
As discussed previously, the mayor would have the ability to approve or veto the budget,
or exercise a line-item veto. 165 The only limitation placed on the mayor’s line-item veto power
would be the restriction that he or she may not veto any portion of the proposed budget relating
to the city council’s own internal expenditures. 166 Once the mayor’s review of the budget was
complete, any sections approved would become effective immediately. 167
Measure L would clarify that the city’s annual budget may be amended, revised, or
modified at any point during the fiscal year, so long as such an amendment, revision, or
modification follows the procedure outlined above. 168
E. Other Major Charter Changes
Measure L would also add several significant sections to the charter related to ethics and
government transparency. 169
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1. Reapportionment and Redistricting
Measure L seeks to establish a nine-member independent redistricting commission to
establish the boundaries of city council districts, thereby removing that power from the city
council. 170 The city council would have to pass an ordinance that establishes the commission,
denotes qualifications required of members, and establishes a process by which members shall be
appointed to serve on the commission no later than 180 days after voters approve Measure L. 171
The city council and the mayor would be precluded from taking part in any commission member
appointments. 172 Upon conclusion of a regular United States census, the commission would
examine council district boundaries to ensure compliance with population regulations, and adopt
modifications to those boundaries, if necessary. 173 Under the existing charter, this is a duty the
city council holds. 174 Furthermore, any boundary modifications the commission made would be
sent to the council, and the council would be required to adopt the commission’s findings
without making changes to them. 175
2. Ethics and Transparency
Measure L would require the city council to take two direct actions to ensure ethical
conduct and transparency. 176 Specifically, the city council would be required to adopt a “Code of
Ethics and Conduct” and a “Sunshine Ordinance.” 177
a. Code of Ethics and Conduct
If approved, Measure L would require the city council to develop and adopt a “Code of
Ethics and Conduct,” for all city officials and appointed members of boards, commissions, and
committees. 178 The council would be required to adopt this code of conduct within 180 days of
Measure L’s passage. 179 Aside from the requirement that the code include a procedure for
removing any elected official or appointed member from office who “substantially violates” the
code, no other substantive details of what the code would or should contain are included in
Measure L’s text. 180 Similarly, the text of Measure L also does not stipulate any consequences if
the council fails to adopt a code of ethics. 181
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Measure L would also require the city council to adopt an ordinance establishing an
ethics committee for the purpose of the ongoing review and monitoring of the “Code of Ethics
and Conduct.” 182 In creating this committee, the council would have the discretion to determine
the required qualifications and conditions of service of future committee members, including any
compensation for service, reimbursement for expenses, terms of office, and methods for
appointment and removal from office, so costs are currently unknown. 183 Measure L clarifies
that this newly established ethics committee “is not a board, commission, or advisory agency for
purposes of Article XV or § 40.” 184 Article XV of the charter defines what boards, commissions,
and advisory agencies are, and delegates powers and responsibilities. 185 Section 40 delegates the
power to appoint or remove members of boards, commissions, and advisory agencies to the
mayor. 186 Thus, Measure L’s articulation that the ethics committee is not a board, commission,
or advisory agency seems to be have been included simply to make clear that it will not have
substantive powers. 187
b. Sunshine Ordinance
In addition, if Measure L is approved, the city council would be required to adopt a socalled “Sunshine Ordinance” within 180 days of its passage. 188 The stated purpose of this
ordinance would be to “liberally provide for the public’s access to city government meetings,
documents, and records.” 189 It is not apparent how Measure L’s Sunshine Ordinance would
differ from existing open government laws, as Measure L does not specify the precise content of
the future ordinance. 190
The preeminent existing law that requires transparency in local government proceedings
is the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Brown Act), which the Legislature approved in 1953. 191 The
Brown Act statutorily guarantees the public’s right of access to local government meetings. 192
The Brown Act also places significant restrictions on how local governments may convene to
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conduct public business as a means of ensuring the public’s right of access to such
proceedings. 193
Because Measure L does not specify the exact provisions of the Sunshine Ordinance, it is
unclear at this time if the intention is that the ordinance should exceed the requirements of
existing law. 194 It should be noted, however, that local governments do have the ability to impose
requirements of open government and transparency that exceed the requirements of the Brown
Act. 195
3. Voter Authorization Provisions
Finally, Measure L also includes provisions requiring prior voter authorization for future
changes to certain sections of the charter. 196 For example, the proposed amendments related to
reapportionment and redistricting, if passed, could only be amended if a majority of the voters
held as such in a regular election. 197 The rest of Measure L’s proposed changes would “sunset,”
or expire, on December 31, 2020, and would be automatically repealed and removed from the
charter. 198 However, Measure L would require the council to place a measure on the ballot at an
election no later than November 3, 2020 to allow voters to consider whether to make Measure
L’s changes permanent. 199
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND CITY CHARTER IMPLICATIONS
A. Single-Subject Rule

The California Constitution imposes a single-subject rule on all initiatives put before the
electorate. 200 This rule applies to all initiatives, whether they are put on the statewide ballot or a
local ballot. 201 The single-subject rule says an initiative is permissible only if “all of its parts are
reasonably germane to each other, and to the general purpose or object of the initiative.” 202 This
rule, however, applies only to initiatives, and not to other types of ballot measures. 203
The California Constitution provides two ways to amend a city charter with the voters for
approval: (1) by an initiative qualified for the ballot through the procedures outlined in the
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California Election Code or (2) by a ballot measure sponsored by the governing body of a
municipality. 204
By definition, an initiative is “the power of the electors to propose statutes and
amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.” 205 The California Election Code
sets forth the initiative process whereby the electorate may draft and approve laws. 206 An
initiative may only be put before the electorate for approval after satisfying various requirements,
including having the Secretary of State certify its language and obtaining a specified number of
signatures when the initiative is circulated for pre-ballot approval. 207
Similarly, the California Constitution vests power in a city’s governing body to propose
by ballot measure ordinances and changes to a city’s charter. 208 The distinctive differences
between the power vested in the electorate and the power vested in a governing body are the
name attributed to each proposal (‘initiative’ for the former, ‘ballot measure’ for the latter) and
in the process by which such proposals make it to the ballot. 209
Thus, given the clear language of the Constitution, a ballot measure proposed by a city’s
governing body is not, by definition, an initiative. 210 Because Measure L’s origin lies with the
city council and not the electorate, it is by definition a ballot measure, and is therefore not
subject to the limitations of the single-subject rule. 211
B. Charter Revision versus Charter Amendment
A city’s charter may be changed via one of two methods: by amendment or by
revision. 212 Whether a change is an amendment or a revision is determined by how substantial
the proposed change would be. 213 Furthermore, a charter amendment may be proposed by the
electorate through the initiative process or by a ballot measure sponsored by the city’s governing
body. 214 Conversely, a charter revision may only be proposed by the city’s governing body
through a ballot measure. 215
“Although the Constitution does not define the terms ‘amendment’ or ‘revision,’ the
courts have developed some guidelines” for their interpretation. 216 An amendment is a less
substantial change; one that does not substantially alter the Constitution (or a charter) in any
204

CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(b); Hernandez, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 21.
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
206
CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9255–9269 (West 2014).
207
Id.; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b)–(c).
208
CAL. CONST. art. XI § 3(b); CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1–2.
209
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a) (defining the initiative power); CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(b) (vesting right to
adopt, amend, or revise a charter).
210
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
211
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (b); Hernandez, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 21–22.
212
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a).
213
Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990).
214
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(b); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
215
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(b).
216
Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 350.
205

160

meaningful quantitative or qualitative fashion. 217 Conversely, a revision is a more substantial,
far-reaching change. 218 The courts have developed a two-part test for determining whether a
proposed change is simply an amendment, or if it rises to the level of a revision. 219 That test
measures both the quantitative and qualitative effects that the proposed measure would have on a
charter, and if the effect of either category is substantial, the courts will find the proposed
measure to be a revision. 220
The same provision of the California Constitution that authorizes a city to adopt a
charter also authorizes the governing body of a city to amend or revise the city’s charter. 221
Conversely, only the power to amend a charter, not revise it, is given to the voters. 222 Thus, a
revision to a city’s charter may only be accomplished when a city’s governing body votes to
place the revision on the ballot, and it is subsequently approved by the voters. 223 This is why the
original attempt to place a citizen-proposed strong-mayor initiative on the ballot was deemed
unconstitutional, because it constituted a substantial revision, not a simple amendment. 224
Because Measure L also seeks to accomplish a revision to city’s charter, it was properly placed
on the ballot as a ballot measure sponsored by the city council, not through the initiative
process. 225
VI.

PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Measure L’s main support comes from the group “Sacramento Tomorrow,” which
includes developer Angelo Tsakopoulos and Mayor Kevin Johnson. 226 Council member Steve
Hansen, who represents central Sacramento, Land Park, and part of Natomas, leads “Stop the
Power Grab,” the coalition of Measure L opponents. 227 Both sides are passionate about their
arguments for and against the measure. 228 Neither side, however, has undertaken a fiscal analysis
of the measure. As a result, there are open questions regarding how much different portions of
the revision will cost. 229
Proponents admit the “city is well-served by its city manager and current form of
government,” but believe Measure L would be an improvement. 230 Opponents are not swayed;
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with recent successes under the current structure, like the development of the new Kings
basketball arena, they seek more concrete proof that a strong-mayor system would be better able
to accomplish similar tasks. 231 This section will examine the arguments on both sides of Measure
L. 232
A. The City Council: Article III
Under the strong-mayor government, the city council would continue to have eight
members elected from districts each representing one-eighth of the city, but the mayor would no
longer have a council seat or vote. 233 Some argue the mayor could get the authority to cast a tiebreaker vote, since there will be an even number of council members. 234 Those opposing
Measure L insist allowing the mayor to vote in the event of a tie is inappropriate. 235
At this time, however, there is no protocol in event of a tie under Measure L. 236 A vote of
four-to-four would mean an ordinance would not pass. 237 Proponents say this probably will not
be a problem, or will only be a minor issue, although admit both sides are speculating. 238 They
point out that five votes will be required just as in the existing system. 239 But, five votes under
the proposed system require the support of 62.5 percent of the council, rather than just over 55
percent, which opponents say is higher than appropriate. 240 It is interesting to note that if
Sacramento already had a five-vote requirement and a non-voting mayor, Measure L would not
be on the ballot since the five-four vote would have been a tie without the mayor’s vote . 241
Although each member’s representation and vote would not change, they would lose
some of their authority. 242 For example, the city council would no longer appoint the city
manager, and the mayor would be able to veto city council-approved ordinances and budgets. 243
Because the mayor will have more power at the expense of the city council as a whole, Measure
L opponents assert council members will have difficulty serving their constituents in the most
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positive way. 244 They decry the shift in power away from nine people to one person—the
mayor. 245
There is an emphasis on interaction between the city council and community through
Measure L’s creation of a Neighborhood Advisory Committee. 246 The text of the measure,
however, leaves the details of this committee completely open. 247 Supporters insist this was to
make Measure L more comprehendible and ensure it did not get bogged down with minor details
as past versions did. 248 Opponents are a little more cynical. 249 They call the committee and other
components of the measure that require future ordinances “sweeteners,” saying each could be
implemented by ordinance now, without a vote on Measure L, if they were truly important. 250
They believe way the measure is written, however, makes the committee seem as if it will be
non-substantive because it is not a “commission,” which would have the power to make
changes. 251 Still, supporters maintain that the committee will be an integral part of the city
government because its meetings will be open to the public and the city council may take its
suggestions under advisement. 252
Measure L’s opponents do not believe it is necessary to change the power structure
because the city council and mayor have worked together to achieve so many positive things,
including creating a budget surplus and keeping the Kings in Sacramento. 253 Supporters assert,
however, that balancing the budget, creating jobs, and reducing crime would be streamlined with
a strong-mayor system. 254
B. The Mayor: Article IV
In Sacramento’s current council-manager system, the mayor is a “figurehead,” attending
ribbon cuttings and promoting the city for tourism. 255 Yet, citizens expect the mayor to solve
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citywide problems and take responsibility for government decisions. 256 Measure L supporters,
including former mayor Phil Isenberg, believe the measure will bring the mayor’s duties and
abilities better in line with public expectations. 257
1. From Figurehead to CEO
Measure L proponents decry the fact that the city manager—currently the equivalent of a
chief executive officer—is not elected. 258 That is why they want the elected mayor to take on
CEO-type duties, including managing police and fire services. 259 But, the mayor may not have
any business or management experience, which is why cities hire professional managers. 260
Therefore, Measure L is a hybrid, where the city can benefit from the manager’s expertise and
the mayor’s accountability, according to supporters. 261
Consolidation of power could also make city departments more effective, according to
supporters, because the mayor would have a greater ability to hold them accountable than the
city manager can while he or she is beholden to the varied interests of council members. 262
Opponents see this as an opportunity for the mayor to do whatever he or she wishes with city
services, without any accountability until, possibly, the next election. 263
The term limits imposed on the mayor would, according to supporters, provide a check
on the mayor’s power. 264 The city manager is unelected, but Measure L proponents prefer
placing that much power into the hands of someone who can be removed through an election or,
if he or she is reelected, at the end of a set number of terms. 265 Some opposed to Measure L do
not believe a vote every four years is enough to balance the amount of power that would be
vested in the mayor. 266 Others do not like term limits because placing an artificial limit on the
time an official can be in office “inappropriately constrains the options of the electorate.” 267
2. Mayoral Veto Power
Although the mayor would be able to veto city council decisions, Measure L proponents
note that this does not give ultimate power to the mayor because the veto can be overridden. 268
256
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But, six members, or 75 percent of the council, would have to vote to override the veto, which
would give the mayor more power than any Governor or the President because the supermajority
required is larger than that at the State or Federal level. 269
How a mayor may use the veto power is unknown, but supporters say it removes any
“temporary block to council actions, or conversely, a temporary block to the mayor’s actions.” 270
Former mayor Phil Isenberg speculated that it will be reserved for fundamental issues. 271 Now,
there is an incentive for the mayor and city council to not make sweeping, and perhaps
controversial, decisions because one would need the support of four others. 272 Veto power may
thus encourage more change. 273
The community may not want the mayor to have this power; a citizen-run committee
engaged to make recommendations regarding a strong-mayor government in Sacramento voted
overwhelmingly to condemn mayoral veto power. 274 Of course, Measure L opponents also feel it
is an inappropriate amount of power to vest in one person. 275
3. Appointment Power
Measure L proponents emphasize the positive checks and balances that would occur if
the mayor appointed the city manager with council concurrence and a public meeting about the
proposed city manager’s qualifications. 276 Those against Measure L, however, stress the fact that
the mayor can remove the city manager at will can cut against these checks and balances. 277
The mayor’s appointment power under Measure L would be more limited than under past
strong-mayor proposals in Sacramento. 278 This revision, however, still divides city employees
into those responsible to the mayor and those who answer to the city council, which could make
the city’s hierarchy confusing. 279 Community members who prefer the current council-manager
government see advantages in a “unified structure…[with] a single consolidated group of
professional staff under the direction of the city manager, who is responsible to the full city
council,” including the mayor. 280
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4. Community Interaction
Since under Measure L, the mayor would no longer be a voting member of the city
council, opponents decry that the mayor can choose not to attend meetings. 281 They assert a
mayor could theoretically never hear the concerns of Sacramento citizens if he or she did not go
to city council meetings, and could make decisions based solely on meetings with private
individuals or groups. 282 There could be “far less public access to the mayor.” 283 This would also
be a circumvention of the Brown Act if the mayor does not attend meetings for which public
access is required under the act. 284 Of course, even if a mayor does attend meetings, he or she is
not required to take community comments made at those meetings under consideration when
making decisions. 285
Supporters of Measure L counter criticism about the omission of Brown Act standards by
pointing to the power of the electorate to remove the mayor if he or she is not responsive to the
people. 286 Also, the mayor and council members alike will continue to engage members of the
public outside of meetings, which very few citizens attend. 287 That engagement, coupled with
additions to mayoral power, may actually be more productive according to proponents, since
members of the public often comment at meetings regarding topics over which the mayor and
city council have no power. 288 “Government provides an endless number of ways to comment,”
and proponents point to the new comment forums available under Measure L, including two
town hall meetings each year in which the mayor must participate. 289
C. The City Manager: Article V
Supporters of Measure L stress that the city manager will still provide his or her expertise
to the mayor, so Sacramento will still have professional guidance. 290 They say the only issue is
whether a voter believes the mayor should or should not direct the city manager. 291
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If the city manager is mayor-appointed, however, those against Measure L believe the
manager will work to support only the mayor’s goals, not those of the city council or the
electorate. 292 Some have even said the city manager may become a de facto chief of staff to the
mayor. 293 Since the city manager would no longer have a one-year grace period during which he
or she could not be removed, the person in that position could feel pressure to follow the mayor,
regardless of the reason or outcome. 294
One item that has not been addressed is whether the city manager’s compensation will
change if the position encompasses fewer duties. Former mayor Heather Fargo speculated that
the city manager’s pay will not decrease, but the mayor would probably get a raise so that he or
she is not making less than the manager, who would be the mayor’s subordinate. 295
D. The Annual Budget: Article IX
The mayor would create and present the budget if Measure L is approved, which means
either the budget would be more voter-influenced because the mayor is elected or the budget
would be full of favors to friends and donors, depending on which side of the debate is
speaking. 296
It could be easier for special interests to influence just one person wielding budgetary
power, rather than an entire city council. 297 Since deep-pocketed donors have contributed to the
campaign supporting Measure L—developer Angelo Tsakopoulos has donated $100,000, the
California Association of Realtors has contributed just under $50,000, Niello Co. has backed the
campaign with $25,000, and Mark Friedman, a Kings owner, has given more than $14,000—
perhaps the monetary influence that opponents are worried about is already taking effect. 298
“Access [to leaders] would be focused and limited to certain individuals” with a lot of money,
according to Measure L’s opposition.299 Yet supporters insist special interests will still need to
work with all eight council members, although they recognize the measure will streamline a
currently “sluggish bureaucracy where…to get something done, they often have to convince at
least five city council members, which can take a lot of time and money.” 300
As with any other council vote, the mayor would have veto power, and overriding that
veto with a supermajority could prove difficult. 301 The creation of an independent budget analyst
could provide a balance against the mayor’s power. 302 If the analyst makes recommendations
292
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that the city council adopts, the mayor may be less likely to use a line-item veto against those
recommendations or an overall veto against the budget. 303 Although Measure L creates the
analyst position, it fails to make recommendations regarding his or her qualifications and does
not consider the cost of hiring a new department head. 304 Therefore, it is unclear if an
independent budget analyst will actually be appointed or whether the position is financially
feasible if Measure L passes. 305
E. Other Major Charter Changes
Measure L will require the city council to fill in some of the details left out of its text, but
will also allow voters to alter the provisions during future general elections. 306
1. Required Ordinances
Several of the main Measure L charter alterations require the council to pass a separate
ordinance within six months of the measure’s passage. 307 These include the creation of
committees for redistricting and ethics, as well as a Sunshine Ordinance. 308 Proponents of
Measure L did not prescribe the parameters of these programs in the measure because voters
found prior versions of strong-mayor initiatives overwhelming when they included all of these
details. 309
This reasoning does not comfort opponents, who say the “trust us and wait” argument
shows a lack of substance in the reforms. 310 Council member Hansen foresees a “delicate dance”
to create ordinances substantive enough so that they have a purpose, but not too substantive so
that they might be vetoed. 311 Since the ordinances do not require a charter change, council
member Hansen would prefer to create substantive ordinances that reform ethics, streamline
governance, and change election rules without a measure half-heartedly commanding the city
council to do so. 312
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2. Amendment by Ballot
Measure L’s charter changes can be amended through future initiatives or measures
placed on the ballot, which could help to close any gaps that surface. 313 For example, if the
measure passes and tie votes in the city council become a problem, voters can solve the issue
with a general election ballot measure. 314 This was an issue that San Diego voters fixed when
they permanently approved their city’s strong-mayor system. 315
If Measure L passes, voters may also choose not to keep a strong-mayor government
when the bill sunsets in 2020. 316 The provision is similar to how other cities adopted their strongmayor systems. 317 Some feel that the sunset date provides false hope for those who dislike the
form of governance; after all the arguments on Measure L, they say voters will be less likely to
change the charter because they don’t want a repeat of “this agony.” 318 Opponents do not want
the next six years to be an experiment, and assert that such a major change to the charter should
be permanent or not happen at all. 319 A few cynics believe the sunset might be designed so that
the strong-mayor system only benefits Mayor Johnson and not his successors. 320
VII.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the decision Sacramento voters make may not really alter the way the city
government works. 321 Researchers have found the council-manager structure and the strongmayor system are fairly equal in terms of ability to implement citizen-supported policies. 322 Both
forms of government generally conform to their constituents’ desires because they are equally
responsive to their communities. 323
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Measure L’s proponents insist the revision would create a better, more modern form of
government that will reduce “bureaucratic roadblocks.” 324 Opponents recognize the popularity of
Mayor Johnson and understand why voters would give him more governmental control, but fear
the measure places too much power in the position, which voters may not like as much when a
less-popular mayor is in charge. 325
Regardless of the way they vote, voters should bear in mind that Measure L proposes a
substantial revision to Sacramento’s existing charter, and the breadth of the proposal warrants
careful consideration of the specific changes. 326
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